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Abstract: This paper examines the effect of changes in migration determinants on the skill level 
of undocumented immigrants from Mexico.  We focus on the effect of changes in economic 
conditions, migrant networks, and border enforcement on the educational attainment of Mexican-
born men who cross the border illegally.  Although previous research indicates that illegal aliens 
from Mexico tend to be unskilled relative to U.S. natives and that economic conditions, networks 
and border enforcement affect the size of illegal immigrant flows across the border, the interaction 
of these variables has not been investigated.  Results from hazard models using data from the 
Mexican Migration Project indicate that improvements in U.S. and Mexican economic conditions 
are associated with relatively less-skilled undocumented immigrants.  Stricter border enforcement 
is associated with higher skill levels.  Access to a network of previous immigrants appears to 
lower the cost of migrating but has no differential effect by skill level. 
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Self-Selection Among Undocumented Immigrants from Mexico 
 
I.  Introduction 
  Illegal immigrant flows from Mexico to the United States are substantial.  Warren (2000) 
estimates that the undocumented Mexican population has grown by an average of 202,000 persons 
each year since 1987, and about 3.1 million illegal aliens from Mexico resided in the U.S. in 
January 1997.  More than 1.5 million apprehensions were made along the U.S. border in fiscal 
year 1999, the vast majority of them originating in Mexico (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, 2000).  The passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986 briefly 
slowed the flow of undocumented migrants by granting legal status to 2.3 million Mexicans, but 
flows have since returned to pre-IRCA levels (Donato, Durand and Massey, 1992). 
The expected benefits, the opportunity cost, and the actual cost of migrating to the U.S. 
affect the size of undocumented migrant flows from Mexico.  Economic conditions in both 
countries, particularly real Mexican wages, play a large role.  Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) 
estimate that a 10 percent decrease in the real Mexican manufacturing wage leads to at least a 6 
percent increase in attempted illegal border crossings.  Declines in agricultural income in Mexico 
similarly raise the likelihood of both first-time and repeat migration from rural areas (Orrenius, 
1999).  Higher U.S. wages relative to Mexican wages are also associated with larger illegal alien 
flows (White, Bean and Espenshade, 1990).  However, migration flows were low during the 
Mexican economic crisis in 1982-83, perhaps because potential migrants had difficulty raising the 
funds necessary to cross the border (Donato, Durand and Massey, 1992).  Tighter border control 
policies and higher fees charged by smugglers (￿coyotes￿) also are negatively associated with 
attempted and actual border crossings by undocumented aliens (Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999; 
Orrenius, 1999).  3
The premise of this paper is that changes in economic conditions and changes in migration 
costs affect the skill composition of the migrant flow as well as their number.  For example, 
increases in real Mexican manufacturing wages may slow immigration of skilled Mexicans who 
work in the nonagricultural sector, while increases in agricultural incomes may reduce 
immigration flows of unskilled workers from rural areas.  Increases in Mexican incomes may also 
enable more individuals to bear the cost of illegally entering the U.S., shifting the distribution of 
undocumented immigrants toward individuals with fewer resources and presumably lower 
education levels.   
  Although studies have examined the effect of changes in economic costs on the number of 
undocumented immigrants, little is known about their effect on the skill composition of illegal 
aliens.  Traditionally, undocumented immigrants from Mexico are young men who have little 
formal education and are from rural areas.  Since the 1980s, however, a growing proportion of 
illegal aliens from Mexico have been from urban areas, and the economic crises in Mexico in 
1982-83 and 1986 reportedly boosted migration from urban areas (Cornelius, 1992; Durand and 
Massey, 1992).  Sorensen and Bean (1994) report that mean years of education among recent 
immigrants from Mexico rose relative to U.S. natives and less recent Mexican immigrants after 
passage of IRCA but do not investigate the reason for the increase. 
  Changes in the composition of Mexican immigrants have implications for both the United 
States and Mexico.  Higher immigration of unskilled individuals depresses the wages of low-
skilled immigrants already present in the U.S. as well as the wages of low-skilled U.S. natives 
(Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997; Jaeger, 1996; Johnson, 1998).  Because low-skilled immigrants 
appear to be a complement to the labor of skilled workers, larger flows of unskilled immigrants 
boost the earnings of skilled U.S. natives and skilled immigrants (Jaeger, 1996; Johnson, 1998).  
Previous research suggests that higher levels of skilled migration have little effect on the wages of  4
U.S. natives (Borjas et al., 1997).  Paradoxically, higher out-migration of skilled individuals may 
promote economic development in Mexico because remittances are positively associated with 
education, and the likelihood that remittances are invested in housing or productive capital instead 
of spent on consumption increases with the educational attainment of the migrant (Durand et al., 
1996). 
  This analysis examines the determinants of self-selection among undocumented male 
immigrants from Mexico.  Using data from the Mexican Migration Project, we first estimate the 
determinants of the likelihood that a man makes an initial illegal trip to the U.S. during the period 
1965-96.  We find that economic conditions in both the U.S. and Mexico are important 
determinants of migration and that increased border enforcement deters illegal migration.  Having 
access to a network of previous migrants provides powerful incentives to migrate.   
We then focus on the effect of changes in migration determinants on the skill level of 
undocumented immigrants.  The results indicate that changes in migration determinants affect the 
self-selection of illegal immigrants to the U.S.  Higher minimum and average wages in the U.S. 
result in greater negative selection (lower skill levels) among immigrants from Mexico.  Better 
economic conditions in Mexico appear to provide a greater disincentive to migrate among skilled 
Mexican men than among the unskilled.  Increased positive selection (higher skill levels) of 
Mexico-U.S. migrants occurs in response to worsened conditions in Mexico and tighter border 
enforcement.  Access to a migration network does not appear to have differential impacts on the 
migration behavior across skill groups. 
 
II.  Theoretical Model 
 
  Beginning with Sjaastad (1962), locational choice models posit that individuals decide 
where to live by comparing their utility in their current location to their expected utility in all other  5
possible locations, including the disutility of moving to those locations, and choose the location 
with the highest utility.  The literature on international migration has focused on the earnings 
component of utility, positing that individuals become immigrants when their expected earnings in 
another country, less migration costs, are higher than their earnings in the country of origin 
(Borjas, 1987; Chiswick, 1999; Taylor, 1987). 
  In the simple model developed here, individuals move if their expected earnings in the 
destination country exceed their earnings in their home country plus migration costs.  Following 
Borjas (1987) and Taylor (1987), an individual migrates from country 0 to country 1 if  
 ln  w1 > ln w0 + ln M,  (1) 
where w is earnings and M is migration costs. 
In addition, an individual must be able to pay the cost of migrating, M, up front in order to 
migrate.  For example, an illegal immigrant hiring a smuggler to assist in his first border crossing 
must pay in advance.
1  This migration cost is paid out of savings, and individuals can migrate only 
if their savings are at least as large as the migration cost.  Because savings and access to capital 
markets depend largely on earnings and wealth, which in turn depend on skill, savings are 
modeled as a function of an individual￿s skill.  Savings are hypothesized to increase with skill.  
Skill is denoted by x and is distributed normally with mean zero and variance σ x
2.  If the savings 
of an individual with skill level x are given by (S + sx), an individual can migrate only if (S + sx) 
≥ M.
2  This ￿cash in advance￿ constraint is consistent with the observation that the least-skilled 
Mexicans do not migrate (Stark and Taylor, 1991). 
                                                 
1 Most commonly, the migrant pays a portion of the smuggler￿s fee in advance and the remaining part upon reaching 
his destination.  The staggered payment means the coyote has an incentive to deliver the migrant and not abandon him 
or allow him to be captured by the Border Patrol.  It still means the migrant has to have the money ready upon 
initiation of the trip however. 
2 An individual may be able to utilize household resources to pay the migration cost.  The predictions of the model are 
similar if ability is correlated across household members or if the willingness of a household to use the household￿s 
savings to pay an individual￿s migration cost depends on that individual￿s ability. 
  6
Immigrants￿ earnings in both the home and destination country also depend on skill, which 
is perfectly observable.  In the home country, the distribution of wages, w0, is given by 
 ln  w0 = ￿0 + ηx,   (2) 
and the distribution of earnings in the destination is  
 ln  w1 = ￿1 + x + ε.   (3) 
Mean earnings in the home and destination country are ￿0 and ￿1, respectively, and η is the return 
to skill in the home country relative to the destination country.  Because the return to skill in 
Mexico is higher than the return to skill in the U.S. (Borjas, 1996), η is greater than one.  The term 
ε is a random component of earnings distributed normally with mean zero, and its value is realized 
after an individual migrates.  










I , (4) 
where m is the log of M, migration costs.  Migration to the U.S. from Mexico occurs when I > 0 
and an individual￿s skill is high enough that savings can cover the migration cost (x ≥ (M-S)/s).  






















































































When the inequality in Equation (6) holds, the model predicts negative selection of Mexican 
immigrants.  This prediction is consistent with previous research suggesting that immigrants from  7
Mexico are negatively selected in terms of human capital variables, particularly education (Borjas, 
1996; Massey, 1987; Taylor, 1987). 
  Figure 1 shows which individuals move from Mexico to the U.S. in this model.  The least-
skilled individuals do not migrate because they do not have enough savings to pay the up front 
cost of migration.  The most-skilled individuals do not migrate because the return to skill is higher 
in Mexico than in the U.S.  The cut-off point for the skill level beyond which individuals do not 
become immigrants is positive in the figure because mean income in the United States is higher 
than in Mexico.  Individuals with skill levels between the two cut-off points become immigrants. 
  The average skill level of immigrants will change as the various factors in the model 
change.  Based on Equation (5), the average skill level of immigrants will decrease as average 
income in Mexico increases.  The average skill level of immigrants will rise as average income in 
the U.S. increases.  The effect of a change in migration costs, M, is ambiguous in the model.  This 
suggests that changes in border enforcement or in access to a network of earlier migrants who can 
help an individual cross the border may either increase or decrease the average skill level of 
immigrants.  The effect of an increase in the skill invariant portion of savings, S, lowers the 
average skill level of migrants as poorer households are able to afford the migration cost. 
This model makes several simplifying assumptions.  It does not include multiple 
destinations, although individuals presumably choose between home and several alternative 
locations.  For example, Mexicans may migrate to the U.S.-Mexico border and work in the 
maquiladora industry instead of crossing into the U.S.  In addition, the model does not distinguish 
between different types of immigration, such as legal and illegal immigration.  We assume that 
individuals would always prefer to migrate legally instead of illegally and that individuals who 
become undocumented immigrants cannot migrate legally.  The model also does not include return 
migration, although many undocumented Mexican workers in the U.S. return to Mexico.  Many of  8
these Mexican immigrants may be ￿target earners￿ who work in the U.S. to earn a predetermined 
amount of money and then leave; alternatively, economic conditions in either country may have 
changed, prompting a return to Mexico.  In either case, the decision to return to Mexico involves 
another round of self-selection that is not studied here.  Incorporating these factors into the model 
should not affect the selective migration predictions. 
 
III.  Data 
 
  We use data from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) to test the predictions of the 
model.  The MMP is a household survey conducted primarily in December and January of 1982-
83 and 1987-97 in 52 communities in Mexico.  The survey focused on areas in Mexico that have 
traditionally sent the majority of migrants to the U.S.  About 200 households were randomly 
sampled in each community, and a complete life history was gathered from the household head.  
This retrospective history emphasizes migration experience, work history, marriage and fertility 
behavior, and property ownership.  In addition, questions were asked about the first and most 
recent trips to the U.S. by the spouse and all children, including nonresident children who have 
formed their own households. 
The MMP offers several advantages over other migration data sources.  The MMP data 
include both migrants and non-migrants, whereas the decennial Census and other U.S. data 
sources include only individuals currently residing in the U.S.  Observing both types of 
individuals allows us to estimate the direction of selection by comparing the characteristics of 
migrants and non-migrants.  The MMP includes legal status at migration, allowing us to focus on 
undocumented migration, whereas most U.S. surveys do not ask about legal status.  Most U.S. 
data sources undersample undocumented immigrants; for example, the 1980 Census captured 
about 50 to 60 percent of undocumented Mexican immigrants (Bean, Lowell and Taylor, 1988).  If  9
the likelihood of an undocumented immigrant being included in the Census depends on skill, then 
results based on Census data will be biased.
3  Selective emigration also complicates use of Census 
data.  In addition, the Census reports year of arrival in the U.S. in intervals, making it difficult to 
ascertain the effect of economic conditions and border enforcement on migration. 
We use data from the 1987-97 MMP surveys, which encompass 47 communities in nine 
states.  Figure 2 highlights these states, which are predominately rural and agricultural.  We focus 
on male household heads and sons aged 15-64 and examine whether they made an undocumented 
first trip to the U.S. in 1965 or later.  Because of the structure of the MMP, we use a sample of 
male household heads and a separate sample of sons of household heads. 
About 70 percent of men report having never migrated to the U.S.  We include one 
observation per year from age 15 (or 1965) until age 64 or their age at the time of the survey for 
these men.  For the 30 percent of men who migrated to the U.S. illegally, we exclude observations 
after the first undocumented trip to the U.S.  The samples are therefore unbalanced panels.  
Individuals who first migrated to the U.S. legally are not included in the sample, although the 
results are robust to including these observations and not differentiating between legal and illegal 
migration.
4  The sample of heads includes 5,878 individuals and a total of 110,334 observations.  
The sample of sons includes 101,003 observations on 9,559 individuals. 
  The MMP includes several characteristics of household heads that are likely to affect the 
probability of migration, such as marital status and the number of minor and adult children the 
head has each year.  These demographic characteristics are not available for the sons, so they are 
included only in the empirical models for the heads.  The empirical models estimated below also 
                                                 
3 Undocumented immigrants who permanently reside in the U.S. were more likely to be covered in the 1980 Census 
than non-settlers, and these individuals are likely to be positively selected because unsuccessful immigrants are more 
likely to return to their country of origin than successful immigrants (Bean, Lowell and Taylor, 1988; Massey, 1987). 
4 The first migration to the U.S. was legal for 114 household heads (1198 observations) and 315 sons (2346 
observations).  Individuals who migrated to the U.S. legally but without permission to work in the U.S. (such as on a 
tourist visa) and worked in the U.S. or who had forged documents are coded as illegal migrants.  10
include a time-invariant indicator variable for whether an individual lives in an urban area in 
Mexico, which is determined based on the size of individuals￿ community of residence at the time 
of the survey.
5 
The number of years of schooling an individual has completed provides the measure of 
skill used here.  We use five categories of educational attainment: no or little formal schooling  
(0-1 years), some schooling (2-5), completed primary school (6-8), completed secondary school 
(9-11), and preparatory school or above (12 and up).  Household heads￿ schooling category can 
change over time because the life histories compiled by the MMP include education each year; 
however, most heads￿ schooling category does not change because very few men in the sample 
attended school after age 15.  Sons￿ schooling category does not vary over time and is their 
educational attainment as of the time of the survey. 
Access to a network of prior migrants is also likely to influence whether an individual 
migrates.  Knowing previous migrants who can provide information about crossing the border and 
finding employment in the U.S. lowers an individual￿s migration cost.  Networks are also an 
important source of loans for migrants who have to pay the smuggler￿s fee up front.  The MMP 
reports whether an individual￿s father has ever migrated to the U.S. and how many of a man￿s 
siblings have ever migrated to the U.S.
6  Family network variables may capture an underlying 
propensity for members of a family to migrate, such as the effect of family income and land 
holdings, in addition to reflecting the effect of access to a migrant network.  The network variables 
                                                 
5 For sons present in the U.S. at the time of the survey, the community is the community in Mexico in which the 
household head resides. 
6 We also include a dummy variable indicating that the father￿s migration history is unknown in the specifications for 
sons.  The estimated coefficient on this variable is not statistically significant in any of the regressions.  The sample 
mean of this variable is 0.23.  The results are similar when sons whose father￿s migration history is not reported are 
not included in the sample.  Among household heads, the number of siblings whose migration history is reported is 
truncated at six. 
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are time varying, and we only include networks before the migrant himself has migrated in order 
to avoid endogeneity problems. 
  The data are merged with annual data on economic conditions in Mexico and the U.S.  For 
Mexico, the value of agricultural output per capita, gross domestic output (GDP) per capita, real 
manufacturing wage and the real interest rate (deflated by the Mexican consumer price index) are 
used.  For the U.S., the average hourly wage for hired agricultural workers, average non-
agricultural wage, and federal minimum wage are included.  These variables are deflated by the 
U.S. CPI for urban consumers.  The U.S. unemployment rate is also included.
7  All economic 
variables are annual averages. 
Total annual hours spent by U.S. Border Patrol agents on linewatch duty is included to 
measure border enforcement.  Previous research suggests that apprehensions are positively 
associated with linewatch hours, but it is not clear whether increased enforcement deters illegal 
immigration because almost all persons attempting to cross the border eventually do so even if 
they are first apprehended several times (Kossoudji, 1992).  Nevertheless, increased border 
enforcement raises the cost of crossing the border by causing migrants to cross in more remote 
areas or hire a coyote to smuggle them into the U.S.  In addition, being apprehended increases the 
amount of time it takes an immigrant to successfully cross the border, creating an opportunity cost 
of foregone workdays. 
                                                 
7 The non-agricultural wage is a weighted average of hourly earnings for production workers in eight industries 
(mining, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, retail trade, transportation and public utilities, 
finance/insurance/real estate, and services).  The weights are based on the industry distribution of Mexican-born men 
aged 15-64 in the 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990 decennial Censuses who immigrated in the last five years and do not 
report being a citizen (except for 1960, when citizenship was not asked).  The industry shares are linearly interpolated, 
and the weights vary by year.  The unemployment rate is constructed in an analogous manner using state 
unemployment rates and the distribution of Mexican-born men across states.  Using unweighted national averages 
gives similar results. 
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Table 1 reports sample means stratified by migrant status for the variables used in this 
analysis.
8  The sample means indicate that men who become undocumented migrants tend to come 
from the middle of the educational distribution.  A larger proportion of non-migrant men has little 
or no formal education than do men who migrate, particularly among household heads.  More non-
migrants also have a high school degree and some university-level education than do migrants.  
The sample means also indicate that the second generation is more educated than the first 
generation, with a considerably higher proportion of both migrant and non-migrant sons having at 
least 5 years of schooling than among the household heads. 
  The descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggest few differences in average economic 
conditions and border enforcement faced by individuals who chose to migrate illegally at some 
point and individuals who are not observed to migrate.  However, there are clear differences in 
access to a network of previous migrants between the two groups.  The fraction of men with a 
father who migrated to the U.S. is higher among migrants than among non-migrants, and migrants 
tend to have more siblings who have migrated to the U.S. than do non-migrants. 
 
Is the MMP Representative of Mexican Immigrants? 
A potential concern about the MMP data is that the survey does not include Mexican-born 
household heads who migrate to the U.S. permanently.
9  If skill affects whether migrants return to 
Mexico, as previous research suggests, our sample of household heads is not representative of all 
potential immigrants because it only includes non-migrants and return migrants.  Previous 
research suggests that Mexican-born migrants who settle in the U.S. tend to be better educated 
                                                 
8 The panel data used to generate these sample means include all observations in the sample and are not a snapshot of 
individuals at a point in time.  For example, the sample means suggest that migrants are younger than nonmigrants 
because observations on migrants are truncated after they migrate, whereas nonmigrants remain in the sample until 
age 64 or the time of the survey. 
9 The MMP also conducts a survey in Mexican communities in the U.S.  We do not use this data because it is not clear 
that the sample is random or representative because the data are gathered using snowball sampling techniques.  13
than sojourners (Donato, 1993).  However, because the survey is conducted during the winter 
months in most communities, a time when Mexican migrants tend to return home for the holidays, 
the survey includes many Mexican-born men who spend most of the year in the U.S.  The sample 
of sons includes non-migrants, return migrants, and men who are present in the U.S. at the time of 
the survey because the information is reported by the head, who is in Mexico.  
We investigate the representativeness of the MMP by comparing educational attainment in 
our two samples to a survey of undocumented immigrants who permanently settled in the U.S.  
The 1989 Legalization Population Survey (LPS) contains data on the characteristics of 
undocumented immigrants who applied for legal permanent resident status in the U.S. under the 
amnesty provision of IRCA in 1986.  To be eligible for the amnesty program, these individuals 
must have resided continuously in the U.S since January 1, 1982.
10  Our sample from the LPS 
includes men who first migrated to the U.S. from Mexico in 1965 or later and were aged 15-64 at 
the time of first migration.  These individuals presumably would not be observed in Mexico by the 
MMP surveys and represent undocumented immigrants who have permanently settled in the U.S. 
Migrants in the MMP tend to be less educated than men in the LPS.  Appendix Table 1 
reports the educational distribution of migrants in the MMP and the educational distribution of 
men in the LPS.  The educational distribution of men in the LPS appears quite similar to sons in 
the MMP, except that a higher fraction of men in the LPS attended preparatory school and/or 
university.  This difference likely results in part from the LPS not including illegal aliens who 
applied for amnesty under the special agricultural worker (SAW) provision of the IRCA.  
Agricultural workers tend to have less education than other workers, and a substantial fraction of 
                                                 
10 About 4 percent of the sample reported that their last year of education was received in the U.S. 
  14
migrants in the MMP worked in agriculture in the U.S.
11  Household heads in the MMP are clearly 
the least educated group among the three samples. 
These descriptive statistics suggest that the sons sample is more representative of Mexican 
immigrants who settle in the U.S. than is the household heads sample.  Because of the nature of 
the MMP survey and the increase in permanent migration from Mexico to the U.S. over time, the 
sample of heads is largely composed of men who permanently reside in Mexico.  Of course, the 
skill levels of both permanent and temporary undocumented immigrants are of interest. 
 
IV.  Methodology 
 
  The determinants of whether an individual migrates to the U.S. illegally are addressed 
using a Cox proportional hazard rate model.
12  We use a hazard rate model instead of a logit or 
linear probability model because we model the likelihood that an individual undertakes a first 
undocumented trip to the U.S. at a given point in time, conditional on the individual not having 
previously migrated.  A hazard model also easily incorporates censoring, which arises in the data 
because some individuals are still at risk of migrating when they are surveyed.  The Cox hazard 
model used here provides a flexible means of modeling the hazard function. 
  In the Cox hazard model, the hazard rate is modeled as a function of both the current 
duration, t, and a set of independent variables, x, or 
  λ(t|x) = λ0(t)exp(β￿x). (7) 
The baseline hazard, λ0(t), is not specified in the Cox model and controls for changes over time in 
the likelihood that an individual migrates.  The model restricts the coefficients to be the same 
                                                 
11 About 40 percent of household heads and 31 percent of sons worked in agriculture during their first undocumented 
trip to the U.S. 
12 Results using a logit model with the dependent variable equal to one in period a man migrated generally gave 
similar results.  Exceptions are noted below. 
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across time implying the proportional effect of a change in x on the hazard is the same at all 
durations.  In other words, the effect of education on the likelihood of migration is the same if an 
individual is 20 years old or 60 years old, given that the individual has not yet migrated.  The 
coefficients, β, give the estimated change in the hazard rate for a one-unit change in x.  For ease of 
interpretation, we report exponentiated coefficients instead of hazard ratios.  The hazard model 
treats all individuals who have not migrated at the time of the survey as right censored. 
The set of independent variables includes measures of demographic characteristics, human 
capital, border enforcement, access to a network of previous migrants, and economic conditions in 
Mexico and the U.S.  Based on previous research, stricter border enforcement is expected to lower 
the hazard of migrating, and having a father or siblings who have already migrated should raise 
the migration hazard.  Better Mexican economic conditions are expected to be negatively 
associated with migration, and better U.S. economic conditions should be positively associated 
with migration. 
To examine the effect of changes in the costs and benefits of migrating on selection, we 
run separate regressions in which the education indicator variables are interacted with covariates 
in the following categories: border enforcement, migrant networks, and economic conditions.  
Selection effects are evident if the effect on the probability of migration differs by education level 
as a covariate changes.  Together with the main effect, the interaction terms indicate the direction 
of selection.  For example, the model predicts that better economic conditions in Mexico lead to 
more negative selection.  Empirical results consistent with the model would show that estimated 
coefficients on the interactions with Mexican wages or agricultural GDP become smaller as 
education increases.   
The model also predicts that improved economic conditions in the U.S. lead to more 
positive selection.  The coefficients on the interactions with U.S. wage variables should therefore  16
become larger as education increases if an increase in those variables led to more positive 
selection.  The model does not give a clear prediction for the effect of changes in border 
enforcement and networks, which proxy for the cost of migration, M, in the model.  The model 
does predict, however, that increases in exogenous savings, S, lead to more negative selection.  If 
family networks share savings with the potential migrant, then empirical results consistent with 
this prediction would show network skill interactions decreasing in education level. 
 
V.  Results 
A.  Baseline Regression Results 
 
Tables 2 and 3 show the results for the baseline regressions of time to migration for 
household heads and sons, respectively.  The first column in each table shows the results when 
only demographic variables are included, and columns 2-5 report results as different sets of 
migration determinants are included.  Column 6 displays the full specification. 
The results for household heads indicate that married men are less likely to migrate.  
Conditional on marital status, the number of minor children in the family is positively related to 
migration.  Urban residence lowers the hazard of migration for both heads and sons. 
Very high and very low levels of schooling are associated with lower migration hazards.  
Men who have completed high school are the least likely to migrate, followed by those with no 
schooling (the omitted group with 0-1 years of schooling).  These results are consistent with the 
predictions of Borjas￿s (1987) model of self-selection, which predicts unskilled immigration from 
countries with wider income distributions, as well as with our formulation of a budget constraint 
on the poorest, least-skilled households. 
Among the older generation, household heads with some schooling, defined as 2-5 years of 
education, are the most likely to migrate.  In the sons sample, those with 6-8 years of schooling  17
have the highest migration hazard.  Among the heads, the relationship between schooling and 
migration turns negative with the group that has 9-11 years of education, whereas for sons the 
relationship does not turn negative until at least 12 years of education.  This suggests, as others 
noted, that the schooling levels of illegal Mexican immigrants have increased over time.
13 
Border enforcement appears to have little effect of the migration decisions of heads or sons 
(column 2).  The coefficient on border enforcement turns negative in the full specification (column 
6), although it is still not statistically significant.  Access to a network of previous migrants 
significantly increases the hazard of migration.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that having 
a migrant network lowers the costs of migration, promoting more migration, and with the findings 
of previous research that networks have a large effect on first trips. 
Mexican economic conditions are also important determinants of whether an 
undocumented trip occurs.  As columns 4 and 6 indicate, improvements in the Mexican rural 
economy, as measured by agricultural output, significantly reduce the hazard of migration.  
Changes in the national economy, measured by per capita GDP, do not have a statistically 
significant effect.  Higher real Mexican interest rates increase the hazard of migration, in particular 
for the sons sample.  This effect is likely a result of the cost of borrowing.  U.S.-bound migrants 
often cite the need to accumulate capital for investment (such as opening a business) or to fund a 
lumpy expenditure (such as a medical procedure) as a reason for migrating (Massey et al., 1987).   
The effect of U.S. economic conditions is reported in columns 5 and 6.  For household 
heads, the only significant variable is average hourly wages in the agricultural sector.  Increases in 
U.S. farm wages increase the hazard of migration among the older generation.  Average non-
agricultural wages and the minimum wage, in contrast, appear to influence sons￿ migration 
                                                 
13 It should be noted, however, that average education levels in the U.S. have been increasing at least as quickly. 
Hence improvements in the education levels of illegal Mexican immigrants have still left them relatively unskilled as 
compared to natives.  18
decisions.  Increases in average wages and in the minimum wage are associated with increased 
hazards of migration in Table 3.  
The results for U.S. economic conditions are consistent with the incentives that U.S. labor 
markets offer Mexican workers and with how those incentives have changed over time.  Relatively 
high U.S. wages attract Mexican labor.  The older immigrants held largely agricultural sector jobs, 
so their migration behavior responded to changes in farm wages.  More recent immigrants are 
more likely than previous immigrants to work in non-agricultural industries, such as 
manufacturing, services, and construction (Donato, 1994).  Consequently, sons￿ migration 
behavior is more affected by non-agricultural wages and the minimum wage.   
 
B.  Selection Results 
Tables 4 and 5 report the findings on the selection effects of migration determinants in the 
hazard models for heads and sons, respectively.  The regressions control for all of the main effects 
and interact one of the migration determinants with the education indicator variables. 
As seen in column 1, migrants with less education are more deterred by increases in border 
enforcement than are migrants with more education.  This result is most obvious in the sons 
regression, where the deterrent effect is the strongest on the least educated, the omitted group, with 
a coefficient of -0.065.  The deterrent effect of more border enforcement then decreases 
monotonically in education to the point where the net effect of increased border enforcement on 
migrants with a high school diploma or more education is no longer negative   (-0.065 + 0.090 =  
0.025).  These results are consistent with heightened border enforcement leading to a more 
positively selected illegal immigrant population.  19
The interaction results for the father and sibling network effects did not indicate any 
significant differences across skill groups for fathers or sons and are not shown here.
14  The model 
did not give a clear prediction for the selection effect of changes in these variables.  One might 
expect, however, that access to a network of previous migrants has a larger effect on low-skilled 
individuals than on high-skilled individuals, who have access to better information or money to 
pay for a guide or smuggler.   
The results of interactions with Mexican agricultural GDP are consistent with the model.  
Among household heads, an improved rural economy leads to significantly lower hazard rates in 
all skill categories but has the greatest impact on the two highest skill groups.  Selection becomes 
more negative as the Mexican economy improves.  The same result holds among sons but none of 
the coefficients are statistically significant, suggesting that the importance of the agricultural 
sector in Mexico has diminished over time.  The greater responsiveness of the high-skilled groups 
also implies that these men experience the largest increase in hazard rates if conditions worsen.  
Modest improvements in the rural Mexican economy may therefore have led to slightly more 
negative selection of illegal immigrants in the mid-1990s than there would otherwise have been. 
The interaction results for Mexican manufacturing wages are similar to those for 
agricultural income.  Among both heads and sons, the interaction terms suggest that selection 
becomes more negative as Mexican wages increase.  For a given increase in the Mexican wage 
rate, the skilled groups delay migration longer (or never migrate) relative to the unskilled.  The 
interaction terms with the Mexican interest rate were all insignificant and did not show a clear 
pattern, so they are not shown here.  
                                                 
14 The sibling network interaction terms were statistically significant and indicated negative selection when a logit or 
linear probability model was used instead of the hazard rate model. 
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The last three columns in Tables 4 and 5 show skill interactions with U.S. economic 
conditions￿the agricultural wage, the non-agricultural wage, and the minimum wage.  The results 
for all three sets of interactions indicate that low-skilled men are relatively more likely to migrate 
than their high-skilled counterparts as U.S. wages rise.  This is the opposite result of that predicted 
by the theoretical model.  For example, column 4 indicates that higher agricultural wages lead to 
greater migration by the least skilled (coefficients of 6.327 and 3.518 for the omitted group in the 
heads and sons regressions, respectively), a result consistent with more negative selection of 
immigrants as farm wages rise.  The net effect of higher agricultural wages is positive and 
significant for the three lower skill groups among the older generation and for the lowest skill 
group (the omitted group) among the younger generation. 
Among sons, it appears that higher agricultural wages not only lure the least skilled but 
also repel the most skilled.  The net effect on sons with at least two years of education is negative.  
The same result is observed for non-agricultural wages among household heads￿higher non-farm 
compensation effectively deters migration by heads in the three upper skill groups.  A potential 
explanation for both these results is a family-based migration strategy in which not all members 
migrate at once, but migration by some substitutes for migration by others (Taylor, 1987).  When 
farm wages are high, the family optimizes by sending members who are agricultural workers 
(often the older family members or household head).  When non-farm wages are relatively high, 
younger family members such as the sons are more likely to migrate. 
More generally, the results for non-agricultural wages shown in column 5 of Tables 4 and 
5 indicate more negative selection as wages rise.  For sons with some schooling, the net effect of 
higher non-agricultural wages on the hazard of migration is 3.435, compared to 8.200 among sons 
with no education.  The net effect for the primary school group is 4.403; secondary school, 1.078; 
and preparatory school, -1.111.  21
The migration behavior of the least skilled groups is also the most responsive to the U.S. 
minimum wage.  Focusing again on the sons sample (Table 5, column 6), an increase in the 
minimum wage increases the hazard of migration by 3.172 for the no schooling group.  The effect 
then decreases as skill increases; the net effect for the some schooling group is 2.704; primary, 
2.357; secondary, 1.120; preparatory or above, -0.101.  There are no clear differences across skill 
groups in the effect of changes in the U.S. unemployment rate, so those results are not shown in 
the tables. 
The empirical results do not bear out the theoretical prediction of more positive selection 
as U.S. economic conditions improve.  The results suggest that skilled individuals are more 
responsive to push factors (conditions within Mexico) and the unskilled are more responsive to 
pull factors (conditions within the United States).  The first finding is consistent with theoretical 
predictions, and the second is not. 
The finding that higher U.S. wages lead to more negative selection of undocumented 
immigrants is consistent with several other theories, however.  For example, the results indicate 
that higher U.S. minimum wages attract relatively more low-skilled immigrants; if the minimum 
wage is binding, the least-skilled individuals benefit the most from increases in it (controlling for 
any disemployment effects).  Also, our model assumes a constant relative rate of return to human 
capital, but if the return to skill in Mexico is rising as non-agricultural wages rise in the United 
States, skilled individuals in Mexico will appear unresponsive to changes in U.S. wages.  A 
solution to the latter problem would be to include a time-varying measure of the return to skills in 
Mexico in the regressions.  Another possible explanation for the limited response of skilled 
workers to changes in U.S. wages is skill transferability.  Limited transferability of skills provides 
a larger disincentive to migrate as skill increases.  If skilled Mexicans cannot qualify for high-end 
jobs in the U.S. because of language or licensing problems or simply because of a lack of  22
institutional knowledge, higher average wages may have less impact on the high-skilled than on 




This paper has examined how changes in migration determinants affect the skill 
composition of undocumented immigrants from Mexico.  Although many studies have shown that 
economic conditions, migrant networks, and border enforcement influence the size of the Mexico-
U.S. migrant flow, research has not addressed the impact of these variables on migrant self-
selection by skill level.  We develop a model that predicts the direction of self-selection among 
migrants in response to changes in the above migration determinants.  The model assumes the 
least skilled are budget constrained and the high skilled earn higher relative returns to skill in the 
home country. 
Our empirical results for the main effects of economic variables, demographic 
characteristics, access to a network of previous migrants, and border enforcement are similar to 
previous research.  When the migration determinants are interacted with skill levels, the findings 
indicate that increased border enforcement has resulted in an illegal immigrant stream that is more 
positively selected, whereas higher U.S. wages and improved conditions in Mexico have had the 
opposite effect.  Higher average U.S. wages and a higher minimum wage are associated with more 
immigration and with more negative selection among illegal immigrants from Mexico.  Improved 
Mexican economic conditions are associated with less immigration but also with relatively lower 
education levels among those who do migrate.  The results imply that when Mexican economic 
crises occur, they lead to more out-migration and to relatively more skilled immigrants.  23
More generally, the empirical results indicate an asymmetric response of migrants in 
different skill groups to Mexican and U.S. economic conditions.  Less-skilled migrants are more 
responsive to pull factors (U.S. wages), whereas more skilled migrants appear more affected by 
push factors (economic conditions in Mexico).  This finding has implications for both researchers 
and policy makers.  As researchers, in modeling the migration decision, we need to consider the 
question of skill transferability and other factors that make certain groups more mobile than 
others.  Policy makers, who face increasing pressure to manage not only the volume of 
immigration but also its composition, can gain from a better understanding of the factors at home 
and abroad that determine the skill composition of illegal immigrants.     
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS BY MIGRANT STATUS 
 
   
    Male Household Heads     Sons   
  Migrants Non-Migrants Migrants Non-Migrants 
Age  25.0 (8.6)  34.9 (12.7)  20.0 (6.3)  24.4 (9.0) 
Married .51  .74  --  --   
Number of minor children  1.52  2.46  --  -- 
Number of older children  .12  .80  --  -- 
Urban  resident  .10 .25 .05 .23 
Educational attainment (years): 
  No or little schooling (0-1)  .17  .24  .06  .07 
  Some  schooling  (2-5)  .37 .26 .26 .18 
  Primary  school  (6-8)  .28 .24 .38 .31 
  Secondary  school  (9-11)  .11 .11 .19 .19 
  Preparatory school and higher (≥ 12)  .07 .15 .11 .25 
Ln(border enforcement hours, 1000s)  58.1 (4.2)  60.3 (4.5)  60.5 (4.0)  62.1 (3.9) 
Migration network: 
  Father has ever migrated  .22  .09  .45  .27 
  Number of siblings have migrated  .49  .28  .80  .50 
Mexican economic conditions: 
  Ln(agricultural GDP per capita)  8.57 (.04)  8.57 (.04)  8.57 (.04)  8.57 (.04) 
  Ln(GDP per capita)  10.89 (.18)  10.96 (.17)  10.98 (.16)  11.02 (.14) 
  Ln(real manufacturing wage)  3.37 (.17)  3.31 (.22)  3.33 (.22)  3.25 (.23)   
  Real interest rate  -7.28 (13.27)  -9.58 (16.40) -11.23 (16.67) -11.52 (18.55) 
U.S. economic conditions: 
  Ln(agricultural hourly wage)  1.46 (.07)  1.46 (.06)  1.47 (.05)  1.46 (.05) 
  Ln(non-agricultural hourly wage)  2.22 (.05)  2.20 (.05)  2.21 (.05)  2.19 (.05) 
  Ln(minimum wage)  1.33 (.12)  1.26 (.14)  1.26 (.14)  1.20 (.14) 
  Unemployment rate  6.45 (1.54)  6.74 (1.46)  6.85 (1.42)  6.94 (1.33) 
Number  of  individuals  1742 4136 3140 6419 
Number  of  observations  17126 93208 22773 78230   
 
NOTE. Sample means (and standard deviations) are shown. All economic variables are real. The U.S. nonagricultural 
wage and unemployment rate are constructed based on the distribution of recent Mexican-born immigrants in the 
1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990 Censuses across industries and states, respectively (see text for details).  27
TABLE 2 
HAZARD RATE ESTIMATES OF UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION, MALE HOUSEHOLD HEADS 
   








  (.066) (.066) (.067) (.066) (.066) (.068) 
Number  of  minor  children  .045** .045** .045** .045** .045**  .047** 
  (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
Number of older children  -.004  -.004  .003  -.003  -.003  .004 
  (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) 
Urban  resident  -1.244** -1.243** -1.022** -1.244** -1.242**  -1.022** 
  (.087) (.087) (.087) (.087) (.087) (.087) 
Educational attainment: 
  Some  schooling  .324** .324** .248** .322** .322**  .244** 
    (.076) (.076) (.077) (.076) (.076) (.077) 
  Primary  school  .262** .262** .142
￿  .261** .259** .140
￿ 
    (.081) (.081) (.083) (.081) (.081) (.083) 
  Secondary  school  -.060 -.060 -.212*  -.062 -.060 -.213* 
    (.101) (.101) (.106) (.101) (.101) (.106) 
  Preparatory  school  -.685** -.685** -.886** -.682** -.682**  -.881** 
    (.112) (.112) (.117) (.112) (.112) (.117) 
Ln(border  enforcement  hours)   .018      -.030 
      (.022)      (.037) 
Migration network: 
  Father has ever migrated      .477**      .474** 
       (.063)     (.063) 
  Number of siblings have migrated     .317**      .318** 
       (.022)     (.022) 
Mexican economic conditions: 
  Ln(agricultural GDP per capita)        -4.948**    -3.878** 
        (1.123)    (1.220) 
  Ln(GDP  per  capita)     .354    1.856 
        (1.050)    (1.457) 
  Ln(real  manufacturing  wage)      -.107    -.669 
        (.351)    (.574) 
  Real  interest  rate     .005*   .001 
        (.002)    (.002) 
U.S. economic conditions: 
  Ln(agricultural  hourly  wage)       4.197**  4.138* 
         (1.239)  (1.628) 
  Ln(non-agricultural  hourly  wage)      .842  .628 
         (1.439)  (1.943) 
  Ln(minimum  wage)       -.110  .343 
         (.595)  (.716) 
  Unemployment  rate       -.013  .001 
         (.026)  (.027) 
Log  likelihood  -13463 -13462 -13262 -13442 -13443  -13231   
  28
￿ significant at .10 level; * significant at .05 level; ** significant at .01 level. 
 
NOTE TO TABLE 2.  No or little schooling is the omitted education category. The regressions also include 8 dummy 
variables for state of residence in Mexico, a linear time trend and trend squared, a post-IRCA dummy variable, and a 
post-Immigration Act of 1990 dummy variable. Standard errors are in parentheses. The data consist of 110,334 




HAZARD RATE ESTIMATES OF UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION, SONS 
   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
Urban  resident  -1.765** -1.765** -1.429** -1.772** -1.766** -1.442** 
  (.090) (.090) (.090) (.090) (.090) (.090) 
Educational attainment:   
  Some  schooling  .410** .410** .370** .411** .411** .371** 
    (.090) (.090) (.090) (.090) (.090) (.090) 
  Primary  school  .468** .468** .380** .469** .470** .384** 
    (.087) (.087) (.088) (.087) (.087) (.088) 
  Secondary  school  .319** .320** .293** .322** .325** .298** 
    (.091) (.091) (.092) (.091) (.091) (.092) 
  Preparatory  school  -.531** -.531** -.587** -.528** -.526** -.582** 
    (.100) (.100) (.100) (.100) (.100) (.100) 
Ln(border  enforcement  hours)   .007      -.036 
      (.015)      (.026) 
Migration network: 
  Father has ever migrated      .461**      .458** 
       (.041)     (.041) 
  Number of siblings have migrated    .215**      .215** 
       (.011)     (.011) 
Mexican economic conditions: 
  Ln(agricultural GDP per capita)        -1.830*    -1.823
￿ 
        (.854)    (.941) 
  Ln(GDP  per  capita)      -.276    -.076 
        (.803)    (1.196) 
  Ln(real  manufacturing  wage)     .203    -.095 
        (.273)    (.448) 
  Real  interest  rate     .004**   .005** 
        (.001)    (.001) 
U.S. economic conditions: 
  Ln(agricultural  hourly  wage)      .045  -1.686 
         (1.021)  (1.407) 
  Ln(non-agricultural  hourly  wage)       2.082  3.781* 
         (1.285)  (1.754) 
  Ln(minimum  wage)       1.192*  2.095** 
         (.525)  (.646) 
  Unemployment  rate       -.041
￿ -.034 
         (.022)  (.022) 
Log  likelihood  -25768 -25768 -25482 -25754 -25758 -25458  
 
￿ significant at .10 level; * significant at .05 level; ** significant at .01 level. 
 
NOTE. No formal schooling is the omitted education category. The regressions also include 8 dummy variables for 
state of residence in Mexico, a linear time trend and trend squared, a post-IRCA dummy variable, and a post-
Immigration Act of 1990 dummy variable. The regressions with network variables also include a dummy variable for 
father￿s migration history not observed. Standard errors are in parentheses. The data consist of 101,003 observations 
on 9,559 men.  31
TABLE 4 
HAZARD RATE ESTIMATES OF INTERACTIONS WITH EDUCATION VARIABLES, MALE HOUSEHOLD HEADS 
   
Interacted variable:    Mexican  Mexican  U.S.  U.S. Non-ag.  U.S. 
  Border  Ag. GDP  Wage  Ag. Wage  Wage  Min. Wage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
Interactions with education: 
 Some  schooling  -.030
￿ -2.882
￿ -.212  -.472  .342  .717 
    (.017) (1.724)  (.400) (1.350) (1.664)  (.536) 
 Primary  school  -.013  -3.455
￿ -.673
￿ -2.749* -3.690*  .054 
    (.018) (1.805)  (.400) (1.409) (1.679)  (.550) 
  Secondary  school  .041  -6.551** -1.735** -6.273** -7.423** -1.653* 
    (.029) (2.240)  (.476) (1.895) (2.152)  (.714) 
  Preparatory  school  .002  -5.956*  -1.703** -7.146** -5.907*  -1.161 
    (.033) (2.483)  (.512) (2.085) (2.334)  (.807) 
Main effects of education: 
 Some  schooling  2.012*  24.935
￿ .967* .941 -.506 -.682 
    (.987)  (14.772) (1.353) (1.996) (3.708)  (.707) 
 Primary  school  .913  29.744
￿ 2.417
￿ 4.200* 8.337*  .073 
    (1.087)  (15.468) (1.352) (2.085) (3.733)  (.717) 
  Secondary  school  -2.767  55.914** 5.544** 9.019**  16.182** 1.797* 
    (1.754)  (19.189) (1.586) (2.784) (4.756)  (.894) 
  Preparatory  school  -1.054 50.152* 4.770**  9.627**  12.181*  .534 
    (1.996)  (21.279) (1.706) (3.062) (5.162) (1.011) 
Border  enforcement  hours  -.021 -.032 -.029 -.022 -.022 -.029 
    (.040) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) 
Migration network: 
  Father has ever migrated  .469**  .475**  .468**  .471**  .466**  .466** 
    (.063) (.063) (.063) (.063) (.063) (.063) 
  Number of siblings have migrated  .318**  .319**  .317**  .319**  .317**  .317** 
    (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022)  32
TABLE 4, CONTINUED 
   
Interacted variable:    Mexican  Mexican  U.S.  U.S. Non-ag.  U.S. 
  Border  Ag. GDP  Wage  Ag. Wage  Wage  Min. Wage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
Mexican economic conditions: 
  Ln(agricultural  GDP  per  capita)  -3.867**  -.564  -3.815** -3.809** -3.905** -3.743** 
    (1.219) (1.826) (1.219) (1.222) (1.224) (1.219) 
  Ln(GDP  per  capita)  1.846 1.791 1.922 1.901 1.564 2.031 
    (1.458) (1.458) (1.454) (1.457) (1.459) (1.458) 
  Ln(real  manufacturing  wage)  -.653 -.703 -.058 -.717 -.621 -.678 
    (.574) (.575) (.659) (.576) (.574) (.573) 
  Real  interest  rate  .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 
    (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
U.S. economic conditions: 
  Ln(agricultural  hourly  wage)  4.182** 4.013*  3.894*  6.327** 4.091*  4.282** 
    (1.628) (1.630) (1.630) (1.961) (1.626) (1.631) 
  Ln(non-agricultural  hourly  wage)  .608 .641 .652 .223  2.092 .682 
    (1.944) (1.943) (1.941) (1.943) (2.294) (1.631) 
  Ln(minimum  wage)  .344 .490 .361 .337 .301 .276 
    (.716) (.715) (.716) (.716) (.717) (.815) 
  Unemployment  rate  .003  .001 -.001 -.003 -.006  .004 
    (.027) (.027) (.027) (.027) (.027) (.027) 
Log  likelihood  -13226 -13226 -13218 -13220 -13218 -13222  
 
￿ significant at .10 level;  * significant at .05 level; ** significant at .01 level. 
 
NOTE. No formal schooling is the omitted education category in the main effects and the interactions. The regressions also include dummy variables for 
married and urban resident, linear variables for the number of minor and adult children, 8 dummy variables for state of residence in Mexico, a linear time trend 
and trend squared, a post-IRCA dummy variable, and a post-Immigration Act of 1990 dummy variable. Standard errors are in parentheses. The data consist of 
110,334 observations on 5,878 men.  33
TABLE 5 
HAZARD RATE ESTIMATES OF INTERACTIONS WITH EDUCATION VARIABLES, SONS 
   
Interacted variable:    Mexican  Mexican  U.S.  U.S. Non-ag.  U.S. 
  Border  Ag. GDP  Wage  Ag. Wage  Wage  Min. Wage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
Interactions with education:   
  Some  schooling  .005  1.851  -.418 -5.687**  -4.765* -.468 
    (.022) (2.068)  (.429) (1.923) (1.998)  (.643) 
  Primary  school  .013 -.042 -.702
￿ -4.186* -3.797
￿ -.815 
    (.022) (1.980)  (.414) (1.869) (1.958)  (.628) 
  Secondary  school  .053*  -1.975  -1.377** -6.792** -7.122** -2.052** 
    (.025) (2.042)  (.435) (2.044) (2.123)  (.683) 
  Preparatory  school  .090** -1.975  -2.139** -9.437** -9.311** -3.273** 
    (.030) (2.231)  (.480) (2.229) (2.316)  (.767) 
Main effects of education: 
  Some  schooling  .075  -15.492 1.781 8.769**  10.926* .975 
    (1.326)  (17.721) (1.442) (2.853) (4.436)  (.823) 
  Primary  school  -.385  .746  2.742* 6.580* 8.820* 1.430 
    (1.326)  (16.967) (1.391) (2.774) (4.345)  (.801) 
 Secondary  school  -2.995
￿ 17.204  4.808**  10.304**  15.986** 2.769** 
    (1.558)  (17.494) (1.453) (3.022) (4.695)  (.854) 
  Preparatory  school  -6.194** 16.334  6.371** 13.287** 19.899**  3.314** 
    (1.840)  (19.113) (1.590) (3.286) (5.111)  (.944) 
Border  enforcement  hours  -.065*  -.036 -.035 -.033 -.032 -.037 
    (.033) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026) 
Migration network: 
  Father has ever migrated  .456**  .460**  .460**  .459**  .457**  .457** 
    (.041) (.041) (.041) (.041) (.041) (.041) 
  Number of siblings have migrated  .217**  .216**  .217**  .216**  .217**  .217** 
    (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011)  34
TABLE 5, CONTINUED 
   
Interacted variable:    Mexican  Mexican  U.S.  U.S. Non-ag.  U.S. 
  Border  Ag. GDP  Wage  Ag. Wage  Wage  Min. Wage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
Mexican economic conditions: 
  Ln(agricultural GDP per capita)  -1.814
￿ -1.680  -1.761
￿ -1.872* -1.883* -1.610
￿ 
    (.942)  (2.056) (.940) (.940) (.942) (.942) 
  Ln(GDP  per  capita)  -.172  -.124 .001 .042  -.213 .110 
    (1.198) (1.195) (1.191) (1.195) (1.195) (1.197) 
  Ln(real  manufacturing  wage)  -.050 -.147  .710 -.163 -.079 -.147 
    (.448) (.448) (.578) (.449) (.447) (.448) 
  Real  interest  rate  .005** .005** .005** .005** .005** .005** 
    (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
U.S. economic conditions: 
  Ln(agricultural  hourly  wage)  -1.621 -1.873 -1.999  3.518 -1.849 -1.564 
    (1.407) (1.409) (1.410) (2.192) (1.406) (1.408) 
  Ln(non-agricultural  hourly  wage) 3.698* 3.851* 3.855* 3.625* 8.200**  3.809* 
    (1.759) (1.752) (1.750) (1.757) (2.469) (1.759) 
  Ln(minimum  wage)  2.122** 2.249** 2.109** 2.113** 2.102** 3.172** 
    (.646) (.647) (.646) (.645) (.645) (.858) 
  Unemployment  rate  -.033 -.033 -.035 -.035 -.040
￿ -.028 
    (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) 
Log  likelihood  -25448 -25452 -25435 -25447 -25445 -25437  
 
￿ significant at .10 level;  * significant at .05 level; ** significant at .01 level. 
 
NOTE. No formal schooling is the omitted education category in the main effects and the interactions. The regressions also include a dummy variable for urban 
residence, a dummy variable for father￿s migration history not observed, 8 dummy variables for state of residence in Mexico, a linear time trend and trend 
squared, a post-IRCA dummy variable, and a post-Immigration Act of 1990 dummy variable. Standard errors are in parentheses. The data consist of 101,003 
observations on 9,559 men. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 
COMPARISON OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF MIGRANTS IN MMP WITH LPS 
   
  
  MMP Male Heads  MMP Sons  LPS   
Educational attainment (years): 
  No or little schooling (0-1)  .14  .05  .08 
  Some schooling (2-5)  .36  .22  .28 
  Primary school (6-8)  .31  .41  .35 
  Secondary  school  (9-11)  .11 .23 .14 
  Preparatory school (≥12)  .08 .09 .15   
 
NOTE. Educational attainment is as of the time of first migration for MMP male household heads and as of the 
time of the survey for MMP sons and LPS. The MMP and LPS samples consist of Mexican-born men who first 
migrated illegally to the U.S. between the ages of 15 and 64 in 1965 or later. 
 